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POLITIK DESENTRALISASI FISKAL DI INDONESIA  
SATU KAJIAN PERUBAHAN DASAR 1974-2004 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
 
Satu unsur utama dalam usaha Indonesia ke arah demokratisasi ialah perubahan 
dasar dalam perhubungan fiskal antara kerajaan. Kajian ini meneliti proses pembuatan 
keputusan tentang dasar desentralisasi fiskal untuk menjelaskan perubahan dan 
kesinambungan dasar, dengan tumpuan kepada perkembangan-perkembangan dari 1974 
hingga 2004. Ini bererti dua fasa: pertama, aturan fiskal yang lebih berpusat dibawah 
peruntukan perundangan 1974 Kerajaan Orde Baru, dan kedua, aturan yang relatif lebih 
tersebar di bawah peruntukan perundangan 1999 yang diubahsuai pada tahun 2004. 
Perundangan 1974 menyediakan asas peraturan fiskal Orde Baru yang berpusat, 
serta kawalan ketat ke atas wilayah-wilayah. Walaupun terdapat undang-undang asas 
yang menggariskan perkongsian hasil antara pusat dan pihak berkuasa tempatan, rejim 
Orde Baru menggunakan pendapatan daripada hasil minyak untuk membeli ketaatan 
wilayah-wilayah melalui dua instrumen dasar: dana SDO yang bertujuan untuk membiayai 
jentera birokrasi tempatan, dan geran Inpres yang digunakan untuk meningkatkan 
pembangunan ekonomi di wilayah-wilayah. Berakhirnya limpahan hasil minyak, komplikasi 
pentadbiran, dan pergantungan yang berlebihan telah menyebabkan Kerajaan Orde Baru 
menimbangkan tindakan desentralisasi. 
Krisis ekonomi dan tumbangnya Kerajaan Orde Baru telah mengubah 
perhubungan fiskal pusat-tempatan. Dengan lulusnya peruntukan perundangan 1999 oleh 
kerajaan sementara, wilayah-wilayah yang kaya dengan sumber telah berjaya 
mendapatkan persetujuan perkongsian hasil. Namun pelaksanaan persetujuan ini dan 
perkembangan-perkembangan terbaru menunjukkan kesinambungan dasar-dasar utama 
di bawah pentadbiran berpusat. Justeru itu kajian ini menekankan kedua-dua aspek 
perubahan dan kesinambungan dalam dasar desentralisasi fiskal.  
Kajian ini juga menunjukkan empat faktor utama yang berkebarangkalian untuk 
mempengaruhi masa depan arah dasar desentralisasi fiskal: keupayaan perkongsian hasil 
untuk memuaskan tuntutan-tuntutan wilayah yang kaya sumber; rundingan politik tentang 
geran DAU untuk mencapai formula keserataan perkongsian antara wilayah; penyelesaian 
perselisihan tentang matlamat penggunaan wang; dan perlunya untuk memastikan 
penyampaian perkhidmatan yang berkesan dan akauntabiliti fiskal di peringkat tempatan. 
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THE POLITICS OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN INDONESIA 
A STUDY ON POLICY DEVELOPMENT 1974 – 2004 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Policy change in inter-governmental fiscal relations is a crucial part of Indonesia’s 
thrust towards democratisation. This study examines the process of decision-making on 
fiscal decentralisation policy in order to explain policy changes and continuities. It focuses 
on developments from 1974 to 2004. This actually consists of two periods: the more 
centralised fiscal arrangements under the 1974 legislation of the New Order government 
and the relatively more decentralised arrangements under the 1999 legislation and its 
modification in 2004. 
 The 1974 legislation provided the basis for the New Order’s centralised fiscal 
arrangements and tight control over the regions. Although there was a basic law providing 
for central-local revenue sharing, the New Order used revenue from the oil boom to buy 
regional acquiescence through two main policy instruments: the SDO funds which were 
basically aimed at maintaining the local bureaucratic machinery, and the Inpres grants 
which were used to boost economic development in the regions. The end of the oil boom, 
administrative complications and regional over-dependence led the New Order 
government to consider some decentralisation measures. 
 The economic crisis and subsequent downfall of the New Order government 
changed central-local fiscal relations. With the 1999 legislation passed by the caretaker 
government, the resource-rich regions were able to lock in some revenue sharing 
arrangements. Subsequent implementation and development, however, shows a 
substantial continuation of the policies under centralised administration. Thus this study 
highlights both continuity and change in fiscal decentralisation policy.  
The study also reveals four main factors that are likely to influence the future 
course of policy development on fiscal decentralisation: the ability of revenue-sharing to 
pacify the resource-rich regions, political negotiations on the DAU block grants to achieve 
a formula-based equalisation among regions, the settlement of disputes over “expenditure 
assignment” or the purposes for which money is to be used, and the need to ensure 
effective service delivery and fiscal accountability at the local level. 
 
 1
CHAPTER  1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The subject matter of this study is the process of policy formulation and change 
with respect to decentralisation in Indonesia during the contemporary period (1974-2004). 
There are many aspects of decentralisation policy in Indonesia. The study focuses on 
decentralisation policy on fiscal issues. Fiscal decentralisation is defined as the devolution 
of fiscal responsibilities from the central government to sub-national levels of government. 
While the debate on the efficacy of fiscal decentralisation is still on going, there has been 
much hope that fiscal decentralisation will produce benefits such as enhanced public 
service delivery, higher economic growth, eradication of poverty, better macroeconomic 
management, and better governance.  
This study is empirical in the sense that it tries to explain the development of fiscal 
decentralisation policy in Indonesia. The focus is on the process of policy development, or 
what actually happened, why and how the actions of policy actors produce the decisional 
output called policy. It is important to bear in mind that policy choices at each stage of 
development is a resultant of interests and views of national and local political actors. 
This chapter consists of five sections that will present the background, rationale, 
research objectives, theoretical framework and methods that are used in this study. The 
first section will explain the main issues in fiscal decentralisation that are commonly 
discussed in the literature. The second section will explain the salient issues in fiscal 
decentralisation in the Indonesian context. The third section will explain the objective of 
this study. Then, the remaining two sections will explain the methodology of this study, 
namely the theoretical framework on policy development and the data collection and 
analytical approach used in this study. 
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1.1 Main Issues in Fiscal Decentralisation 
 
The basic idea of fiscal decentralisation is to disperse the burden of development 
and public service provision as well as financial resources from the central to the sub-
national governments that are closer to the citizens. In so doing, the sub-national 
governments’ capacity will be strengthened. According to Bahl & Linn,1 three general 
arguments might be given in support of fiscal decentralisation. First, if expenditure mix and 
tax rates are determined at levels closer to the people, local public services will improve 
and local residents will be more satisfied with government services. Second, when 
responsibilities for taxation, financial policies, and services are devolved to local 
governments, these governments would compete to do the best for the people. In turn, it 
would create more capable local governments. Third, overall resource mobilisation will be 
increased because local governments can tax the fast-growing parts of their economic 
base more effectively than can the central government. In mobilising resources, central 
government is usually hampered by geographical conditions and span of control. 
Therefore, when local governments are given more responsibility, resource mobilisation 
would be better undertaken. 
There might be a number of rationale – economic, social, and political – to justify 
such devolution or decentralisation. The most frequently quoted justifications for 
decentralising financial functions are to: close the fiscal gap, equalise fiscal capacities 
among different levels of government, increase effectiveness of central expenditures, and 
prevent separatist threats. Sub-national governments are frequently faced with fiscal gaps 
because there are too few revenue sources allocated to local governments. They have to 
spend beyond their means for development and public services, and they are not making 
                                                 
1 Roy Bahl and Johannes Linn, Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), p. 386. 
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effective use of the revenue resources available to them. Fiscal decentralisation is aimed 
at ameliorating these problems of the fiscal gap. Fiscal decentralisation is also used to 
promote effective use of government expenditures for public services as the authority to 
allocate the budget is delegated to sub-national governments that are closer to the people. 
By possessing budget control, it is expected that they will ensure that expenditure is more 
effective and more accountable. Also, it is aimed at equalising fiscal capacities among 
sub-national governments. In many countries, particularly those containing areas with 
various dominant ethnic groups and unequal resources, fiscal decentralisation has an 
important political purpose. Richer regions would want independence unless they get – or 
get to keep – more of the revenue they generate. Therefore, fiscal decentralisation can be 
instrumental to maintaining the national territory and preventing separatist threats. 
Despite the theoretical benefits of fiscal decentralisation, its actual practices raises 
complex issues about the assignment of fiscal responsibilities to various levels of 
government. Two basic issues immediately present themselves:2 First, on expenditure 
assignment, what types of spending should be conducted by what levels of government? 
Next, on revenue assignment, what types of revenue should be raised and what tax rates 
should be set by what levels of government? Resolving these issues requires answering 
other questions that they entail. These prominently include the following. How should 
intergovernmental grants and revenue sharing be used to fill the gap between 
expenditures and revenues at sub-national levels and to provide the right incentives to 
sub-national government? Which level is responsible for tax administration and the public 
expenditure management system? Which level should design and administer futher 
regulations? How should regulations be harmonised across various levels of government? 
These questions in turn involve many more issues regarding the intergovernmental 
institutional structures and financial relationships. 
                                                 
2 Hamid R. Davoodi, “Fiscal Decentralisation”, IMF Research Bulletin, 2(2), June 2001. 
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There is a wide variety of institutional structures and financial relationships 
between national and sub-national governments among countries in the world. These 
relationships seem to have little to do with the political structure of the country, whether it 
is a unitary or a federal system. Intergovernmental relations in federal systems often differ 
as much among themselves as with unitary countries. Most of the time, constitutional 
provisions do not entirely reflect the reality in intergovernmental relations.  
The literature also discusses methods to decentralise fiscal and financial matters to 
the lower levels of government. According to Ebel,3 fiscal decentralisation relates to: 
sorting out roles and responsibilities among governments; intergovernmental transfers; 
strengthening local revenue systems or defining local service delivery systems; privatising 
state-owned enterprises (sometimes a local responsibility); and providing a safety net. 
Islam4 argued the need for multiple instruments and requirements in fiscal decentralisation, 
ranging from equalization grants, local borrowing framework and non-distortionary local 
taxes to local capacity building and democratic accountability at the local level. These are 
needed to achieve the various objective of decentralisation policy. In the public finance 
literature, grants are categorised based on four factors:5 the conditions of usage, that is the 
intended use of grants, whether grants will be used for specific services or for general 
purposes; the allocation method, whether grants are automatically allocated by a formula 
or require an application associated with a specific project; the requirement for recipient 
governments to provide some matching funds to the grants they receive; and  the limits on 
the amount of grants.  
                                                 
3 Robert Ebel, The Economics of Fiscal Decentralisation (World Bank paper, 2000). 
 
4 Inayatul Islam, Making Decentralisation Work: Reaping the Rewards and Managing the Risks 
(UNSFIR Working Paper, 1999). 
 
5 Ronald Fisher, State and Local Public Finance, (Chicago: Irwin Publications, 1996), p. 36; Claudia 
Buentjen, Fiscal Decentralisation in Indonesia: The Challenge of Designing Institutions 
(Jakarta:GTZ-SfDM Project, 1998), p. 22. 
 
 5
With a variety of forms in inter-governmental grants and fiscal relations, there is 
also a wide array of incentive as well as disincentive effects for the lower levels of 
government. Depending on their design, matching grants and tax revenue assignments, 
for example, may spur fiscal effort at sub-national levels, but in doing so produce 
asymmetrical results that may be viewed as inequitable. Many grants and mandates arise 
from centrally-determined policy priorities. Thus, they help advance these priorities in a 
coordinated fashion across the country, but sometimes at the cost of distorting the political 
and fiscal initiatives of regions and localities that may have divergent priorities. Perhaps, 
the most important danger is the potential for soft budgets and moral hazard created by 
transfer systems that do not make revenue-matching or other conditions part of their 
formulae.6  
Therefore, assigning transfers and devolving tax administration are inherently 
problematic. Hedd, for example, has shown the difficulties of simultaneously pursuing the 
commonly cited objectives of territorial equity, interpersonal equity and local autonomy.7 
Moreover, sometimes problems arise not only because of conflicting objectives but also 
because of conflicting approaches and the need to give up some short-term objectives for 
longer-term ones. For example, there might be a trade-off between macroeconomic 
stability and public services after fiscal decentralisation.8 Again, in many technical issues, 
the question for fiscal decentralisation policy is how to do it rather than what should be 
                                                 
6 Omar Azfar, et al., Decentralisation, Governance and Public Service: The Impact of Institutional 
Arrangements (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Paper, 1999), p. 12. 
 
7 David Hedd, Public Expenditure: The Defence and Reform (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983), p.  
252. 
 
8 Bahl & Linn, Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries, p. 470. A macro-economic analysis 
using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model on Indonesia showed a possible positive 
long-term result for the national economic development yet aggravated regional disparities and 
deterioration in the delivery of public services in the short-term. See Edi Effendi Tedjakusuma, 
Analysis of the Impacts of Fiscal Decentralisation on Regional Development in Indonesia 
(Unpublished PhD thesis, Nagoya University, 2000). 
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done. Most successful fiscal decentralisation efforts exhibit an appropriate matching of 
methods (as represented by the form of grant schemes, revenue-sharing formulas, and 
specific local tax assignments) with setting or context  (in terms of resources, capacities, 
infrastructure and local development needs).  
Many factors are likely to influence whether or not decentralisation improves the 
efficiency of resource allocation, promotes service quality and accountability, and reduces 
corruption in public services. Azfar et al.,9 stated that decentralisation works best, indeed 
may only be meaningful, if there is local democracy, and local democracy works best in 
socially and economically homogeneous communities. They also stated that the devolution 
of taxation power can create vertical externalities in terms of tax rates that are too high. 
What is meant by vertical externalities is the tendency for different levels of government to 
compete with each other in exploiting the same tax base. However, such competition may 
result in a higher burden for the tax payers, that is, the ordinary people.   
Decentralisation policy will be successful if sub-national government systems are 
institutionalised enough for creating democratic governance. In spite of theoretical 
differences between those following more technocratic and more political approaches to 
decentralisation, most clearly agree that political factors shape the response to 
decentralisation. Samoff10 clearly stated that, from the perspective and in terms of the 
goals of those initiating decentralisation, “decentralisation is effective only when it is 
compatible with the interests of those expected to implement and defend it”. Again, this is 
to emphasize the importance of political variables in the process of implementing 
                                                 
9 Omar Azfar et al., Decentralisation, Governance and Public Services: The Impact of Institutional 
Arrangements (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Paper, 1999), p. 28. 
 
10 J. Samoff, “Decentralisation: The Politics of Interventionism” in Kent Eaton, “Political Obstacles to 
Decentralisation: Evidence from Argentina and the Philippines”, Development and Change 
Vol.32, 2001, p. 523. 
 
 7
decentralisation policies and of ensuring that they will result in positive outcomes to the 
society. 
 Political variables are at work from the very beginning of particular decentralisation 
policies. Short-term political calculations can result in the decision to decentralise, and 
often these decisions are not followed through or are quickly subjected to reversal. In 
many cases, the policies on inter-governmental fiscal relations swing back and forth 
between decentralisation and re-centralisation. Politicians may support re-centralisation 
not only because they come to believe that they were mistaken in their earlier support for 
decentralisation as a response to systemic problems, but also because electoral and 
political realities have shifted. Based on a comparative research in Argentina and the 
Philippines, Eaton11 found that although the speed and scope of the shift toward more 
decentralised practices is striking, the policy faces enormous political obstacles and can 
be subject to serious setbacks. Even after the political decision to decentralise has been 
made, national politicians may be persuaded by deep-seated incentives to preserve 
centralised control over fiscal policy.  
 Even in seemingly technical policies such as those in economic and financial 
areas, contextual and/or political factors will determine importantly the course of policy 
actions.12 In developing countries, the results of decentralisation policy are more difficult to 
predict because of the greater uncertainty in many contextual variables. Regarding fiscal 
decentralisation policy, there have been many cases in developing countries where more 
taxing power and expenditure responsibility were given to the local governments, but the 
goal of the policy could not be attained due to political hurdles at the local level. Bahl and 
                                                 
11 Kent Eaton, Development and Change, p. 101. 
 
12 See, for example, B. Guy Peters & Frans K.M. van Nispen, Public Policy Instruments: Evaluating 
the Tools of Public Administration (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), p. 3. 
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Linn13 observed that there are a number of political constraints in developing countries: 
local councils are often appointed rather than elected and therefore may not be 
representative of the local population; local taxing powers and responsibilities for 
expenditure are severely circumscribed; there may be administrative constraints on local 
governments that prohibit either an increase in taxation or an expansion of public services; 
and the chief officers who carry out the delivery of services are often appointed by a higher 
level of government. At the national level, there are also many contextual variables such 
as the geographical conditions of the country, the administrative system, the size of the 
population, the nature of the political system, and even the stage of economic and political 
development that would determine the peoples’ demand for decentralisation.  
   
                                                 
13 Bahl and Linn, Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries, p. 419. 
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1.2 Fiscal Decentralisation as an Issue in Indonesia 
 
Being the largest archipelagic state in the world, Indonesia is characterised by 
geographical and social diversity so that distribution of power and decentralisation are 
extremely important issues. Aside from sheer size, the country is also one of marked 
contrasts. Of the 206 million total population in 2000, about 61.9 per cent were living on 
the small island of Java which represents only 7 per cent of the country’s total land area. 
The other 38.1 per cent of the population were spread unevenly throughout the far greater 
land areas of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua (formerly Irian Jaya), the so-
called outer islands. In terms of its social fabric, although Javanese are the dominant 
ethnic group, there are some 300 ethnic groups scattered throughout the country. 
Together with ethnicity that influences most aspects of Indonesian life, religion is another 
important factor in the diverse society. Though predominantly Muslim, Indonesia 
recognizes three other official religions – Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism – which all 
play a recognized and often influential role in Indonesian society. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that many of the tensions and even conflicts have been rooted in this diverse 
social background.14  
 The New Order regime was established after Suharto assumed power with military 
support in 1969. Under the New Order, Indonesia had a highly centralised administration. 
All political power resided in Jakarta, and the central government controlled the nation’s 
economic wealth. The ability of the centralised New Order regime to stay in power was 
basically supported by the following: the unreserved military loyalty to the regime, the 
systematic de-politicization of nearly all socio-economic institutions, the 1974 enactment 
                                                 
14 For a comprehensive account of the social diversity in the country, see Colin MacAndrews, 
Central and Local Government in Indonesia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, East Asian 
Social Science Monographs, 1986). 
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that gave the central government control over the regions, and the rapid economic 
development that resulted in better infrastructure and higher economic wealth across the 
regions.15 It is undeniable, however, that the New Order approach to development was 
carried out with much suppression, little political participation, and disregard of provincial 
and local wishes for greater autonomy. With Suharto out of office, pressures for 
decentralisation arose immediately.16 Advocates of decentralisation argued on grounds of 
both economic efficiency and political expediency, noting the resentment generated in the 
outer islands against Jakarta’s dominance. With the strong call for democratisation and 
decentralisation in almost all regions in the country, the Habibie government virtually had 
no choice but to reverse the centripetal tendency that has been in existence for decades. 
 Movement toward decentralisation was unprecedentedly triggered by the eventual 
independence of East Timor. Historically, East Timor was a former Portuguese colony 
while Indonesia’s other territories were all under the control of the Netherlands. The 
Special Province of Aceh and the resource-rich province of Papua are among the 
provinces with relatively strong secessionist movements. In Aceh, the discovery of mass 
graves containing bodies apparently of those killed by the Indonesian military in the early 
1990s revived secessionist sentiment. On November 1999 as many as one million people 
gathered in Aceh’s provincial capital, Banda Aceh, to call for a referendum on whether to 
                                                 
15 This thesis generally uses three terms for different tiers of government: 1) central, 2) provincial, 
and 3) district (which includes rural districts or kabupaten and urban districts or kota). The lower 
two tiers will be collectively called “sub-national” or “local” to accord with the generally made 
central-local distinction. In many Indonesian legal provisions, however, the term daerah (region) 
refers to both provinces and districts, i.e. synonymously with sub-national. The Indonesian 
literature also uses both these terms. Therefore, to facilitate cross-references, this thesis will also 
use these two terms interchangeably. It should also be noted that students of federal systems 
typically speak of state and local governments (municipalities, town councils, etc.), which roughly 
corresponds with provinces and districts in the Indonesian context. Both kabupaten and kota are 
further divided into subdistricts, known as kecamatan. Finally each kecamatan consists of 
“villages”, which form the lowest level of governments.  
 
16 Adam A. Schwarz & Jonathan Paris, The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia (New York: Council 
on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), p. 3. 
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stay within Indonesia or become independent. Secessionist and independence 
movements were also revived in Papua where the Free Papua Organisation (Organisasi 
Papua Merdeka: OPM) started to conduct its activities publicly. Papua is considerably rich 
in natural resources such as copper, gold and oil, but development there has lagged 
behind other regions. Resentment was growing, and the local community was demanding 
a larger share of the wealth extracted from the province. 
 All these challenges were confronted by Habibie when he became president in May 
1998. Since Indonesians had been under a repressive regime for a long time, the 
experiment with political liberalisation under Habibie created enormous uncertainty. A 
democratic Indonesia committed to open markets and regional stability was the hope of 
many Indonesians and many of Indonesia’s friends abroad. But there were no guarantees 
that Indonesia would turn out this way. No one could say that regional tensions would not 
spiral out of control, turning Indonesia into an Asian version of strife-torn Yugoslavia.17 No 
one could say whether the military would agree to a lower political profile, or that 
continuing civil unrest would not lead to a return to authoritarianism.  
 With East Timor and Aceh, the central government could have made people there 
feel they were being treated fairly as Indonesians if it had sincerely tried to understand the 
situation and demonstrate that by deeds. By doing so, the central government could have 
eased resentment and tempered the secessionist movements. Unfortunately, what Jakarta 
did, conspicuously under the Suharto administration, was to intimidate revolting regions or 
residents by armed force when necessary, and force them to obey its will. Instead of 
lessening resentment, the policy stimulated hatred among the residents in the outer-island 
regions, which led to the outbursts in 1998 when the military was in retreat. 
                                                 
17 Adam A. Schwartz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability (New South Wales: Allen 
& Unwin, 1999), p. 419. 
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 Therefore, the decentralisation policy has high political stakes. Unless the central 
government pursues decentralisation skilfully and carefully, Indonesian territorial integrity 
is at risk. To some extent, Indonesia is engaged in a race against itself. It must install and 
then consolidate a democratic process while fending off a range of threats. The Indonesian 
central government can no longer procrastinate with respect to the policy time-frame for 
decentralisation. This is especially true given the increasing demands for regional 
autonomy at present and in the foreseeable future.  
 Decentralisation in Indonesia took a big step forward during Habibie’s presidency 
with the enactment of Law No. 22 of 1999 on Regional Government Administration and 
Law No. 25 of 1999 on Balanced Budget between Central and Regional Governments. 
Significant changes were introduced with these two laws. There are two concepts of region 
in sub-national administration in Indonesia: daerah, a unit for presumably local 
autonomous administration, and wilayah, an administrative unit for central government 
functions. In the previous regional government administration, daerahs refer to first-level 
regions (provinces) and second-level regions (districts/cities), while wilayahs consist of 
provinces, district/cities and sub-districts. In the wilayah concept, district/cities were made 
subordinate to provinces and sub-districts to districts/cities. Under Law No. 22 of 1999, 
daerahs were provinces and districts/cities as before, but wilayahs were limited to 
provinces only. The district/city governments were no longer directly responsible to the 
provincial government while the provincial governments were put in charge solely of inter-
district/city matters. As this study is aimed at explaining political decentralisation or 
devolution of powers among different levels of governments, it focuses more on the 
concept of daerah rather than wilayah.  
 The most important provision in Law No. 22 of 1999 was that the provincial and 
local legislatures were given more political powers. Before that, heads of sub-national 
governments – governors of the provinces, bupati (regent) of the rural districts, and 
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walikota (mayor) of the urban districts – were practically appointed by the President 
through the Ministry of Home Affairs while the sub-national parliaments only had the right 
to propose the candidates. Under Law No. 22 of 1999, the heads of regions were elected 
by the DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, sub-national parliaments) and made 
accountable to the regional and local constituents. The law opened the way for central-
provincial-district government relationship to undergo a major change.18  
 Enacted almost simultaneously with Law No. 22 of 1999 on regional government 
administration, Law No. 25 of 1999 was specifically intended to eliminate dissatisfaction in 
rich natural resource provinces. The law provided for considerable fiscal decentralisation. 
It stipulates that local governments’ fiscal revenues are to be composed of local revenue, 
balancing fund (dana perimbangan), loans, and other revenues. The legislation permits 
inter alia the development of own-tax sources for local governments, although it does not 
specify these. The balancing fund is sub-categorised into four: the local portion of revenue 
from natural resources (especially oil and gas mining and forestry); the local portion from 
property tax (Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan: land and building tax); a general allocation fund 
(Dana Alokasi Umum / DAU); and a special allocation fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus / DAK). 
These will be explained in detail later.  
The new fiscal decentralisation policy created an immediate concern, that is inter-
regional inequality. In general, Indonesian provinces can be classified into five groups: the 
densely populated Java, Bali and Lampung in southern Sumatra; the four resource-rich 
provinces of Papua, East Kalimantan, Riau and Aceh; isolated provinces (the two 
Nusatenggaras); five ‘settled’ provinces off Java; and another five sparsely settled 
                                                 
18 Yuri Sato, Indonesian Entering New Era: Abdurrahman Wahid Government and Its Challenge 
(Chiba: Institute of Developing Economics, IDE-JETRO, 2000), p. 40. 
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provinces.19 The 1999 legislation’s provision on revenue sharing will definitely benefit the 
resource-rich provinces, but will not mean anything and even result in a loss for the poorer 
provinces. This is because oil and gas production are very unevenly distributed across the 
regions. A statistical projection by the Indonesian Ministry of Finance revealed that the 
policy will only provide benefits to three provinces where can be found large deposits of oil 
and natural gas deposits, namely Aceh, Riau and Kalimantan Timur, while it will certainly 
imply loss for a majority of other provinces.20 Unfortunately, the scheme for revenue 
sharing had to be passed to pacify the resource-rich regions. Political realities made some 
form of fiscal decentralisation, e.g. revenue sharing and local taxes, inevitable.  
This study covers the contemporary period until 2004 when the 1999 laws were 
revised. This revision effected a compromise between the central, provincial and district 
governments on some decentralisation measures. In line with the constitutional 
amendment in 2002 that envisioned direct elections of the national as well as sub-national 
leaders, it was necessary to revise Law No. 22 of 1999, particularly its stipulation that the 
heads of regions were to be selected by the DPRD. Also, this law was considered as 
having created confusion and administrative disorder because of the removal of 
hierarchical relationships between the provincial and the district governments. Therefore, 
in order to address these two issues, Law No. 22 of 1999 was revised with the enactment 
of Law No. 32 of 2004 on regional administration.  
At the same time, Law No. 25 of 1999 was also revised with the enactment of Law 
No. 33 of 2004 on fiscal balance between central and regional governments. Along with 
the stipulation for restoring hierarchical relationships between the provincial and the district 
                                                 
19 Hall Hill, Intra-Country Regional Disparities (Singapore: The Second Asian Development Forum, 
2000). 
 
20 Ministry of Finance, “Revenue Capacities of Provincial Government in FY 1999/2000”, as quoted 
in Ehtisham Ahmad & Bert Hoffman, Indonesia: Decentralisation – Opportunities and Risks 
(World Bank paper, June 1999), p. 15.  
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governments, Law No. 33 of 2004 gives a higher proportion of block-grant allocation to the 
provincial governments. This law also provides better formulas for determining the 
financial allotment to the sub-national governments. It is likely that this law will be the main 
guideline for implementing fiscal decentralisation policy in the foreseeable future.  
The year of 2004 may also be viewed as marking an end to the turbulence of 
Indonesia’s political transition after the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime. This is the year 
when the first direct presidential election was conducted smoothly and peacefully. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono was elected as the new president with a landslide victory. The two 
revised laws on decentralisation policy were signed by the newly inaugurated Susilo, who 
will then be responsible for implementing the policy accordingly.  
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1.3  Research Objective 
 
The main objective of the study is to explain how particular policies of fiscal 
decentralisation have been formulated, implemented and subsequently changed. The 
main factors that influence the course of policy development in fiscal decentralisation are 
political in nature. As such, the political interactions among the policy makers at the 
central, provincial and local governments and other stakeholders form the focus of this 
study.  
In terms of the timeframe, this research covers the period between 1974 and 2004. 
The study focuses on three important episodes of policy development on decentralisation 
during this period. The examination of each episode includes the prior or intervening 
developments that lead to it and shape its outcomes. The first culminates in the enactment 
of Law No. 5 of 1974 on the Regional Administration System during the New Order regime 
under president Suharto.  
The second culminates in the enactment of Law No. 22 of 1999 on Regional 
Government Administration and Law No. 25 of 1999 on the Balanced Budget between 
Central and Regional Governments. Compared to the 1974 laws, these two laws 
substantially changed the pattern of relationships between the central, provincial and 
district/city governments and constituted a major progress in terms of fiscal 
decentralisation. Finally, the third episode culminates in the enactment of Law No. 32 and 
Law No. 33 of 2004. These laws contain some compromises between the central 
government and sub-national governments.  
 There have been many studies on decentralisation in Indonesia. Some examine 
the political aspects of decentralisation and how the relationships between the national 
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government and the sub-national governments are settled.21 Others focus more on 
economic, administrative or technical aspects of decentralisation, such as the resource 
potential of sub-national governments, how the central government deals with issues of 
inequalities among sub-national governments, the sub-national governments’ capability to 
undertake decentralised public services, and how the sub-national governments manage 
their revenues or enhance the tax assignments.22 However, there are few studies on the 
linkages between macro political issues and fiscal issues in decentralisation. The study is 
therefore aimed at filling this research gap. The other reason for choosing fiscal 
decentralisation as the focus of study is that the issue will most probably continue to be the 
major concern in developing Indonesia. As the preceding section makes clear, the 
distribution of fiscal resources is the most important bone of contention between the 
national and sub-national governments in Indonesia.  
 The theoretical question to be answered is: How can the policy on fiscal 
decentralisation and its changes be satisfactorily explained? This is taken up in the next 
section.  
 
                                                 
21 See, for example, William R. Liddle, Ethnicity, Party and National Integration: An Indonesian Case 
Study (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); Audrey R. Kahin, Regional Dynamics of the 
Indonesian Revolution: Unity from Diversity (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); 
Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, The Politics of Unrest (Singapore: ISEAS, 1994). 
 
22 Colin MacAndrews, Central and Local Government in Indonesia (Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, East Asian Social Science Monographs, 1986); Goeritno Mangkoesoebroto, Tax Incidence 
in a Developing Country: The Case of Indonesia (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Boulder: University of 
Colorado, 1987); Roy Bahl & Johannes Linn, Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Hall Hill, Intra-Country Regional Disparities, (Singapore: 
The Second Asian Development Forum, 2000). 
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1.4 Policy Development: The Theoretical Framework 
 
This study follows the common definition of public policy as “a proposed course of 
action of a person, group, or government within a given environment providing obstacles 
and opportunities which the policy was proposed to utilize and overcome in an effort to 
reach a goal or realize an objective or a purpose”.23 Public policy does not only deal with 
individual or segmented interests, but it deals more with common objectives, public 
interests, or citizens at large. The proposed course of action that constitutes policy is then 
implemented through subsequent decisions and actions. Public policy is also defined 
comprehensively as the sum of government activities, whether acting directly or through 
agents, as those actions have an influence on the lives of citizens.24 Such a definition 
would include what is called policy implementation.  
The common approach of understanding how a policy is made is to identify a 
certain sequence of steps such as inquiry of problem, identification of goals, design and 
evaluation of alternatives and the choice of decision.25 This way of looking at policy making 
is useful for imposing initial order or structure on a complex process. But it risks viewing 
policy making as though it was mechanistic and controlled by one governing mind, which 
is clearly not the case in real life. It does not adequately capture the complexity of the 
policy process and the different ways in which policies emerge. As Lindblom26 has stated, 
sometimes policies spring from new opportunities, not from problems. Sometimes policies 
                                                 
23 Carl Friedrich, An Introduction to Political Theory: Twelve Lectures at Harvard (Boston: Harvard 
University Press, 1967). 
 
24 Guy B. Peters, American Public Policy: Promise and Performance (New Jersey: Chatham House 
Publishers, Inc., 1996), p. 4. 
 
25 Austin Ranney, Political Science and Public Policy (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 
1968), p. 7. 
 
26 Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968), p. 4. 
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are not decided upon but nevertheless happen. No one would say that the British 
government in India planned mass starvation in Bengal during World War II. Yet the 
government did not bring adequate grain into the famine area, as it could have. In an 
important sense, then, tolerating starvation in Bengal was established as a government 
policy, without anyone explicitly deciding on it. Incapability and inaction might, by 
themselves, constitute a policy. In other words, deciding not to act is also a policy decision. 
This is in line with a straightforward definition that “public policy is whatever governments 
choose to do or not to do”.27  
 The framework used in this study consists of two essential parts. First, like all 
policies, the policy on fiscal decentralisation is the result of an interminable process of 
political decision-making episodes. Second, these decisions result from the actions and re-
actions of policy actors. To explain these decisions, it is important to examine these 
actions of policy actors – actions that reflect their interests and their perception on 
available alternatives and possibilities for attaining their interests.  
 It is obvious that there is a close relationship between politics and policy. Politics 
can be defined simply as the activity by which an issue of public concern is agitated or 
settled at various levels of government. Policy is thus the outcome of the political 
process.28 People engage in political activity – voting, electioneering, communicating with 
public officials, holding office – because they hope to affect public policy in some way. The 
study of politics, by and large, can be viewed as the study of the various factors which, 
directly and indirectly, affect public policy making. As long as the conflicts remain private, 
no political process would need to be initiated. Conflicts become political only when a 
                                                 
27 Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1981), p. 1. 
 
28 Marian D. Irish, & James W. Prothro, The Politics of American Democracy (New York: Englewood 
Cliffs, 1962), p.16; James E. Anderson, Politics and the Economy (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1966), p. 49; Michael Hill, The Policy Process in the Modern State (London: Prentice 
Hall, 1997), p. 8. 
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public policy is at stake and an attempt is made to involve wider publics in its settlement. 
As for decentralisation policy, Smoke29 notes that efforts at decentralisation have been 
politicised in many developing countries. Decentralisation policy concerns administrative or 
technical matters but it is a prominent instrument for coping with political problems and for 
achieving political goals. 
Given the many political factors working on policies on fiscal decentralisation, it is 
not surprising that fiscal intergovernmental relationships move back and forth between 
decentralisation and centralisation. Movement toward more decentralised practices may 
be striking in a particular stage, but the policy might soon encounter political as well as 
technical obstacles and can be subject to serious setbacks. This accords with most 
theoretical explanations of public policy making that the policy process will never come to 
a final decision and that the “policy process is not one process but a series of sub-
processes”.30 There are always good and bad effects in centralisation as well as in 
decentralisation. Thus, analysts who emphasize decentralisation often also point to the 
necessity to retain centralisation in particular issues. Some have even tried to map out the 
advantages of both centralisation and decentralisation policies.31 It is therefore not 
surprising that the history of decentralisation policy in many developing countries is 
characterised by frequent swings of the pendulum between central and regional 
governments. 
 Therefore, this study is based on the following important propositions: 
                                                 
29 Paul Smoke, Reforming Regional Government in Developing Countries (Morocco: HIID 
Conference on Economic Policy Reform in Developing Countries, 1988). 
 
30 Jeremy J. Richardson &   A.G. Jordan (eds.), Governing Under Pressure: The Policy Process in a 
Post-Parliamentary Democracy (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979), p. 153. 
 
31 Katalin Pallai, The Framework of Decentralisation (World Bank Paper, 2001). See also Kuldeep 
Mathur, “Administrative Decentralisation in Asia” in Shabbir Cheema, & Dennis A. Rondinelli 
(eds.), Decentralisation and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries, 
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983), p. 64. 
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a. Fiscal decentralisation affects the interests of multiple parties or groups in the 
country at both national and sub-national levels. 
b. Since each group has different interests while fiscal decentralisation affects those 
interests differently, the policy tends to create gains for a particular group at the 
expense of the others.  
c. Like other public policies, a formulated policy on fiscal decentralisation is a 
tentative compromise among groups of actors and reflects varying degrees of 
accommodation of the interests of contending actors. 
d. The balance between fiscal centralisation and decentralisation is subject to 
continual shifts. Once settled, a given policy or resolution is not permanent but is 
subject to change. Some actors or groups would agitate for change and this 
agitation reflects: 1) how actors see their interests in the light of experience or even 
their re-evaluation and re-ordering of the multiple interests with changing 
conditions; 2) the relative power position and relations among actors; and 3) 
perceptions of new opportunities to agitate for change or more favourable policy 
settlement. 
Fiscal decentralisation policy involves more than just two actors. Thus while the 
focus is on the interaction between the central government and sub-national authorities, 
attention should also be given to ideas and influences coming from other organisations 
within the national and regional government system. This is clear from Allison’s model of 
bureaucratic politics,32 in which governmental action is understood as the political resultant 
of bargaining among multiple actors. The positions of players, parochial priorities and 
perceptions, interests, stakes and stands, rules of the game, and power are among the 
essential elements to be analysed. The term ‘central-local government interactions’ can be 
                                                 
32 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little & 
Brown and Company, 1971). 
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misleading if it encourages a narrow focus on the interaction between central departments 
and local authorities. In practice, a range of other organisations cut across the relationship, 
including the regional authority associations, professional organisations, party institutions, 
quasi-governmental organisations and trade unions,33 are usually involved in the policy 
process. 
Policy formulation is a difficult game to play because any number of people can 
and do play, and there are few rules.34 At one time or another, almost every kind of policy 
actor could be involved in formulating policy proposals. Several actors, however, are 
especially important in formulating policies. A classic model of the policy formulation 
process is formulated by Anderson.35 He explains that public policies constitute the 
product of interactions among legislature, executive, administrative agencies and judiciary. 
In the process, they are influenced by other external groups of political parties and interest 
groups and the citizens at large. The model focuses on what Lindblom36 calls “the 
proximate policy makers”, which consists of the president, legislators, judges, and interest 
groups. Aside from the official policy makers, there are also many unofficial actors who 
might have significant influence in policy formulation. Political parties and candidates are 
not as good in promulgating solutions to problems as they are in identifying problems and 
presenting lofty ambitions for society. Expertise begins to play a large role, given that the 
success or failure of a policy will depend to some degree on its technical feasibility as well 
as its political acceptability. Thus various parties with relevant expertise are able to 
                                                 
33 Gerry Stoker, The Politics of Local Government (Hampshire: MacMillan Education Ltd., 1988), p. 
136. 
 
34 Peters, American Public Policy,  p. 59. 
 
35 Anderson, Politics and the Economy, p. 53. 
 
36 Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, p. 71. 
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influence policy formulation, such as think tanks, shadow cabinets, technocrats, 
professionals, or policy analysts.  
 The role of experts and professionals as well as interest groups and individual 
citizens has increased as a result of the intensification of social interactions.37 There are 
more actors with various values who come in and influence modern public policy and the 
tendency toward a policy ‘polyarchy’38 is almost inevitable. These values are pursued 
through existing institutions or individual actions. The growing importance of pluralistic 
decision making systems and the more complicated relationships among parties, 
bureaucracy and interest groups in policy formulation have been found in many developed 
countries, such as Norway, Japan, Sweden, the Netherlands and Britain.39 The direct 
influence of various interest groups and the tendency toward pluralistic decision making in 
developed countries may not occur to the same extent in developing countries. However, 
pressure groups outside the government or the so-called extra-administrative institutions 
are also common in most developing countries.40 In Indonesia, it has been predicted even 
during the authoritarian New Order administration that greater social confidence will lead 
to a more pluralistic and organised sharing of power and communication among various 
levels of Indonesian society.41 Interest groups have played an increasing role in the public 
                                                 
37 David G. Garson, Handbook of Political Science Methods (Boston: Holbrook Press Inc., 1971), p. 
23. 
 
38 Wayne Parsons, Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1995), p. 253. 
 
39 Richardson & Jordan (eds.), Governing Under Pressure, p. 169.  
 
40 See for example, Ishwar Dayal et al., Dynamics of Formulating Policy in Government of India 
(Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 1976), p. 25. 
 
41 Gary E. Hansen, “Bureaucratic Linkages and Policy-Making in Indonesia: BIMAS Revisited” in 
Karl D. Jackson & Lucian W. Pye, Political Power and Communications in Indonesia (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978), p. 342. 
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policy process, especially with the onset of reformasi and greater openness following the 
economic crisis in 1998.42  
Most public policies also have multiple objectives. A  major issue in policy decision 
making is how much of one objective is to be achieved in relation to others.43  The 
objective of a policy in employment, for example, is to achieve full employment without 
causing inflation, endangering the nation’s trade abroad or creating further environmental 
deterioration. Likewise, the objective of policy in fiscal decentralisation is to strengthen the 
regional governments’ capacity, to improve public services and to maintain democratic 
governance, while at the same time it has to avoid separatism, inter-regional imbalances, 
unfair competition, and so on. It is also important to bear in mind that problems of 
conflicting objectives are not only faced by government actors but also those outside the 
government. The behaviours of other non-government actors, their demands, and their 
actions to influence the government will reflect multiple objectives. In fact, the problems of 
multiple objectives are faced by all actors in varying degrees.  
Another important element for understanding policy-making process is the 
circumstances in which policy elites make decisions. Grindle and Thomas44 identify two 
typical kinds of circumstances, perceived crisis (macro-politics) and politics-as-usual 
(micro-politics). Macro-political concerns, most prevalent under crisis situations, mean that 
policy elites pay particular attention to a policy problem which affect the legitimacy of the 
regime they serve, longer-term political and economic goals, major definitions of ‘the 
national interest’, class alignments, and the overall survival of the regime. On the other 
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Institute, 1999). 
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